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Abstract 
 
In addition to the ordinary corporate income tax, special purpose taxes are sometimes levied 
to extract abnormal profits arising from the use of natural resources. Such dual tax regimes 
exist in Norway for oil and hydropower, where the corresponding special purpose tax bases 
are unaffected by any derivatives payments. Dual tax firms with hedging programs therefore 
face the risk of potentially large discrepancies between the tax bases for corporate income tax 
and special purpose taxes. I investigate how this tax base asymmetry influences the extent of 
hedging of value-maximizing firms facing hedgeable as well as unhedgeable risk. Dual tax 
firms facing deadweight costs in low-profit events generally demand less hedging than 
ordinary firms, but otherwise respond similarly to characteristics of the underlying risk 
exposures. The special purpose tax does not influence firms’ hedge portfolios in the absence 
of deadweight cost. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Companies involved in upstream activities on the Norwegian continental shelf are 
liable for a special purpose petroleum tax at a rate of 50% on top of corporate income tax at a 
rate of 28%. Because crude oil sales are taxed at norm prices set by an official board instead 
of actual prices, derivative payoffs are excluded from the special purpose tax base. Norwegian 
hydroelectricity producers similarly face tax provisions that preclude derivative payoffs from 
the tax base of a special purpose hydropower tax at a rate of 30%. These tax provisions form a 
wedge between the tax bases for corporate income and special purpose taxes for firms with 
hedging programs involving derivatives. How does this tax base asymmetry influence the 
extent of hedging demanded by firms? Alternatively, are these special purpose taxes, 
allegedly designed to extract a portion of abnormal profits arising from the use of natural 
resources like oil and waterfalls, neutral in terms of the hedge ratios chosen by firms? While 
the conditions under which such taxes are neutral in terms of firms’ investment decisions have 
been extensively studied1, few have studied the potential impact of dual taxes on firms’ risk 
management strategies. With cross-border market integration, firms that operate in essentially 
the same market sometimes face special purpose taxes evaded by their competitors across the 
border. Norwegian and Swedish hydroelectricity producers constitute one prominent example: 
the former set of firms is subject to special purpose taxation, while the latter is liable to tax on 
corporate income at a rate of 26.3% (28% before 2009).2 Both sets of firms operate at Nord 
Pool, the Nordic electricity exchange, facing basically the same prices except for occasional 
divergence between price areas (Marckhoff & Wimschulte, 2009). My research identifies 
                                                 
1 See Lund (vedlegg 1) and Hagen and Åvitsland (vedlegg 2) in NOU 2000:18 for an extensive discussion of neutral resource rent extraction 
(in Norwegian). Interested readers may also consult the references therein, e.g., Bulow & Summers (1984) and Fane (1987). More recent 
discussions are provided by Lund (2009) and Boadway and Keen (2009). Updated information about the Norwegian hydro power tax regime 
may be found in Sections 9 and 21 of Ot.prp. nr. 1, versions 2007-2008 and 2009, respectively (also in Norwegian). For a brief description in 
English, see ”Tax Facts Norway 2009, A Survey of the Norwegian Tax System”  by KPMG LAW ADVOKATFIRMA DA. Information 
about the petroleum tax regime in Norway may be found in the publication ”Facts – The Norwegian Petroleum Sector” by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (downloadable at www.petrofacts.no). 
 
2 See PWC Worldwide tax summaries or the publication”Taxes in Sweden - An English Summary of Tax Statistical Yearbook of Sweden”  
published by the Swedish Tax Agency (www.skatteverket.se). 
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under what conditions and to what extent special purpose taxes can be expected to influence 
the hedging strategies of firms operating in incomplete markets.   
The influence of tax base asymmetry on the extent of hedging has not been extensively 
analyzed in the literature, but Lien (2004) attributes the low trading volumes of U.S. corn 
yield (quantity) futures in the late 1990s to the inability of these contracts to offset tax gains 
or losses from the spot positions. Lien arrives at this conclusion by analyzing a utility-
maximizing constant-returns-to-scale firm that faces uncertain quantity and price to be 
realized the next period (t = 1). To reduce the risk, the firm may trade both price and quantity 
forward contracts at t = 0. In terms of taxation, any loss from trading in the price futures 
contract can offset production profits; this is not the case for quantity futures. A no-hedging 
result follows for the tax-disadvantaged quantity futures contract under the restrictive 
assumptions that the value of any negative tax income is zero and that a zero correlation exists 
between price and quantity innovations. Lien (2004) concludes that ”quantity futures 
contracts do not provide any hedging function” (p. 32), so the failure of these contracts should 
come as no surprise. 
Although firms can sometimes trade their quantity exposure, this is generally not the 
case for energy companies. Hydroelectricity producers face unpredictable variations in yearly 
inflows that cannot be hedged, at least not at reasonable terms. Oil producers also face 
unpredictable variations in output. The research question now posed therefore differs from 
that of Lien (2004); quantity risk is presumed unhedgeable, while price risk may be 
transferred in organized derivatives markets. How does tax base asymmetry influence how 
firms manage their price risk exposure under these circumstances? In order to disentangle this 
influence under less restrictive tax assumptions than those employed by Lien, the possibility 
that the absolute value of the tax on an arbitrary positive profit may be larger than the absolute 
value of the tax savings arising from a loss of similar magnitude is considered (Altshuler & 
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Auerbach, 1990; Eldor & Zilcha, 2002). Only in a few countries are firms actually 
compensated for negative tax incomes (tax loss carryback), and the ability to carry losses 
forward is time-constrained in most countries. Besides, interest is usually foregone when only 
tax loss carryforward applies. This type of tax asymmetry is characterized by nondecreasing 
marginal tax rates or convex tax functions. My analysis shows that firms subject to tax base 
asymmetry are expected to hedge less than firms facing corporate taxes only under certain 
conditions, but the reduction in hedging demand is far from the ’no hedge’ result of Lien. 
However, Lien analyzes a tax disadvantaged derivative contract with quantity-dependent 
payoff; I address the influence of a similar tax disadvantage on a hedge portfolio with price-
dependent payoffs under less restrictive tax and correlation assumptions. Quantity risk is 
presumed unhedgeable in this setting.3 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a general model 
of firms’ hedging activities with dual taxes and, accordingly, tax base asymmetry. The 
conditions under which special purpose taxes distort firms’ hedging choices are outlined, 
namely when firms face deadweight costs, that is, direct and indirect costs of financial distress 
or costly external financing in low-profit events. Section 3 analyzes how tax base asymmetry 
influences firms’ hedging choices under such conditions when the representative firm adheres 
to linear hedging instruments. An analytical result applicable to firms facing tax base 
asymmetry and linear tax functions is presented together with an extensive numerical analysis 
addressing hedge portfolio distortions under more general tax exposure. Section 4 concludes 
the paper by arguing that the findings are expected to extend beyond the two Norwegian 
special purpose tax regimes referred to above. After all, these are nothing but variants of tax 
                                                 
3 The problems addressed are related to previous research on the effect of price uncertainty on the operation of competitive firms (Broll, Kit 
Pong, & Zilcha, 1999; Domar & Musgrave, 1944; Moschini & Lapan, 1992; Sandmo, 1971; Stiglitz, 1969). Zilcha and Eldor (2004) 
integrate different strands of this literature and demonstrate that the optimal production of a utility-maximizing producer is unaffected by 
convex tax exposures in the presence of markets for forward contracts. Nevertheless, convex tax exposures will affect the optimal forward 
sales of a utility-maximizing producer. This paper takes a different starting point by focusing on how tax asymmetries in general influence 
the hedging policies of value-maximizing firms facing stochastic production and price and, possibly, deadweight costs in low after-tax profit 
events. 
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regimes for rent extraction found in many other countries (see Table 3 in Baunsgaard, 
(2001)). 
 
2. A general model of hedging under a dual tax regime  
Special purpose taxes may be analyzed in the economic setting of Brown and Toft 
(2002), that is, in terms of short-run hedging strategies conditional on fixed capital structure, 
dividend policy, production technology, investments, etc. Firms face two sources of 
uncertainty at t = 0 in this economic environment. First, the revenue from selling one unit of 
production is uncertain because market clearing prices are under the influence of exogenous 
processes, such as weather conditions or business cycles. Second, firms’ production may vary 
as a result of unpredictable demand variations or stochastic production technology. These risk 
exposures may be partially hedged at t = 0 by entering into a set of derivatives contracts 
paying ' ( )g pa h  at t = 1, where p is the realized spot price, gh  a vector of real valued 
functions representing gross contract payments for long positions in the different contracts, 
and a  a vector representing the number of long contracts for different derivatives. Under the 
assumptions of no arbitrage and zero risk-free interest rates, any derivative contract settled at t 
= 1 must satisfy the condition 
 ( ) ( ) 0
P
h p g p dp   (1) 
where h represents net contract payoff and g is the risk neutral marginal density of P. Thus, 
any derivative contract must have zero risk neutral expectation after the price has been 
deducted from the gross contract payoff to avoid potential arbitrage profits inconsistent with 
economic equilibrium. Firms are liable for corporate taxes on net profits and possibly also a 
special purpose tax on the net spot value of production. The net profit subject to corporate 
taxation is defined by subtracting variable and fixed costs from sales revenue and adding the 
net payoffs from derivatives contracts. Distinct from the corporate tax, the special purpose tax 
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is unaffected by derivatives transactions. Subtracting taxes from net profits defines net profit 
after taxes, the determinant of deadweight costs for all firms. Net economic profit at t = 1 is 
given by net profit after taxes minus deadweight costs.  
The economic environment described above can be represented by a recursive 
equation system governed by the two random variables (RVs) P and Q. Net profit (NP) and 
special purpose income (SPI), the bases of corporate (CT) and special purpose taxes (SPT), 
are both given by the realizations p and q of the RVs P and Q at t = 1. However, the two tax 
incomes differ in terms of treatment of derivatives payoff and, possibly, fixed costs. While net 
profit is the income from the spot market minus variable and fixed costs plus the net 
derivatives payoff ' ( ),pa h  special purpose income ignores derivatives payments. 
Furthermore, the tax code for special purpose income may limit the amount of interest 
deductions and prescribe different rules for depreciation of assets. These differences are 
represented by the two functions 2:u   and 2:v   . Both taxes are assumed to be 
increasing functions of their respective tax incomes. Deadweight costs (DWC) incurred at 
year end in low after-tax profit events are given as a function of net profit after taxes (NPAT). 
Finally, the economic profit () of a firm is defined as net profit after taxes minus deadweight 
costs.4 
 
 ( , ) ' ( )NP u p q p  a h  (2) 
  
0
'( ) , 0 ' 1 
NP
CT NP CT s ds CT    (3) 
  SPI v p,q    (4) 
                                                 
4 Altschuler and Auerbach (1990) make a distinction between the current and the effective marginal tax rates. The former is defined as the 
derivative of current taxes with respect to current income and the latter as the current marginal tax rate adjusted for the influence on future 
and previous taxes. These authors argue that the two potential corrections needed to derive a firm’s effective marginal tax rate are (1) the 
reduction in future taxes due to increased carryback potential and (2) the increase in future taxes due to a reduction in unused tax shields. In 
the non-dynamic setup of Brown and Toft, the derivatives of the tax functions CT(NP) and SPT(SPI) are best interpreted as effective 
marginal tax rates.  
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  
0
'( ) , 0 '    1
SPI
SPT SPI SPT s ds SPT    (5) 
 0   ' ' 1CT NRI    (6) 
 NPAT NP CT SPT     (7) 
 ( ' 0 )DWC DWC NPAT DWC   (8) 
  NPAT DWCP    (9) 
 
The general model is defined by equations (1)-(9), a behavioral assumption, two exogenously 
specified marginal tax rate functions, a technical restriction and two RVs, P and Q, in a risk 
neutral probability space  , , mPW  . The behavioral assumption states that firms maximize 
the expected value of net economic profit at t = 1, that is, for a given set of tradable contracts 
h , firms solve the maximization problem: 
 
 max E ( ) max ( , ; ) ( ( , ; ))
( ( , )) ( ( , ; )) } ( , )
{S S P Q NP p q CT NP p q
SPT SPI p q DWC NPAT p q f p q dqdp
P  
 
 a aa a a
a (10) 
under a risk neutral measure given by the density f. Each choice of a generally entails a 
different marginal density for the RV , so the maximization problem is equivalent to 
choosing from among alternative RVs  solely on the basis of expectation. Under the 
technical restriction that  E P   a  is concave in an open set of contract numbers S, value-
maximization is equivalent to solving the first order conditions (one for each derivative 
contract): 
 
   E ( ) ( , ; ) 1 '( ( , ; ))
(1 '( ( , ; )) ) ( , )}
{
P Q
NP p q CT NP p q
DWC NPAT p q f p q dqdp
P   
 
 a a aa a
a 0
 (11) 
Thus, value-maximizing firms choose a vector a that equates the expected marginal change in 
net profit after taxes with the expected marginal change in deadweight costs for all 
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derivatives. In the special case of constant marginal corporate tax rates, this condition 
simplifies to 
 
  E ( ) ( , ; ) '( ( , ; ))  ( , )  
P Q
NP p q DWC NPAT p q f p q dqdp
P       
a a a 0
a a
 (12) 
 
This is true as expected net profit after taxes is unaffected by the choice of hedge portfolio for 
a linear tax function.  
The model above generalizes Brown and Toft's (2002) model to an economy where 
firms could face dual taxes and, accordingly, tax base asymmetry. In this setup, hedge 
portfolio gains and losses are taxed only once, while every other item is liable to corporate 
and special purpose taxes.  As the period of interest is one calendar year (in conformity with 
the tax code), the cost and capital structure of the firm are considered predetermined. 
Predictions are therefore best understood as optimal, short-run hedging strategies conditional 
on some factors that are presumed to be fixed during a calendar year (capital structure, 
dividend policy, production technology, etc.). Thus, the analysis effectively controls for the 
potential influence of the debt capacity hedging incentive (Stulz, 1996). Even on this general 
level, two important results follow: 
Proposition 1: Consider firms that do not face deadweight costs in low after-tax profit events, 
i.e., DWC’(npat) = 0  npat. Under these conditions, firms subject to special purpose tax 
liabilities will choose the same hedge portfolio as otherwise identical firms facing corporate 
taxes only. Because these firms cannot change their expected special purpose tax liabilities by 
entering into derivatives contracts, their only motivation for hedging would be to reduce 
expected corporate tax liabilities facing convex corporate tax exposures (Smith & Stulz, 
1985). This motivation is the same for otherwise identical firms; therefore, the special 
purpose tax is neutral in terms of firms' hedging choices. Proof.  Follows directly from (11) 
and the concavity assumption. Note that this result is not conditional on constant-returns-to-
scale.  
 
Proposition 2: Consider firms that face deadweight costs in low after-tax profit events. In this 
case, firms facing dual taxes may choose different hedge portfolios than otherwise identical 
firms liable for corporate taxes only. The special purpose tax is not neutral in terms of firms' 
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hedging choices under these circumstances.  Proof. Follows directly from (11) and the fact 
that the choice of hedge portfolio (the vector a) influences after-tax profits and consequently, 
deadweight costs. 
 
 
The current specification of deadweight costs makes sense when these costs are primarily 
driven by firm value (Hahnenstein & Röder, 2007; Merton, 1973, 1974). However, if costly 
cash shortfall is the key constituent of deadweight costs in the spirit of Froot and Stein (1993), 
a more cash-flow oriented approach is appropriate.  Such an economic environment may be 
modeled by adding one restriction to the general model, that is, by calculating after-tax profits 
in equation (8) using zero marginal tax rates for all negative profits. In that case, any future 
tax benefits associated with negative profits are irrelevant for deadweight costs because these 
benefits do not mitigate concurrent costs of external financing. In conclusion, special purpose 
taxation will only distort the hedging choices of firms that face prospects of deadweight costs 
in low after-tax profit events. The significance of these adjustments is analyzed in the next 
section. 
 
3.  Forward contract demand with special purpose taxes and deadweight costs 
The following analysis is confined to hedging with forward contracts, consistent with 
the tradition of the literature preceding Eldor and Zilcha (2004). Just as forward and futures 
contracts (swaps) have been the main vehicles for risk transferral in the Nordic electricity 
market since the market's inception in 1995, there is ample evidence in the literature 
documenting the widespread use of linear hedging strategies. In a study of U.S. nonfinancial 
firms, Gay, Nam, and Turac (2002) report that 69% of commodity risk exposures, 75% of 
currency exposures, and 70% of interest exposures are managed with linear derivatives. 
Huang, Ryan, and Wiggins (2007) find that 73% of firms that use derivatives manage interest 
and currency risk exposures entirely in terms of linear hedging instruments. Benson and 
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Oliver (2004) and Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) report qualitatively similar results. From a 
theoretical point of view, Brown and Toft's (2002) perfect exotic hedge, a quadratic function 
of price, features the same sensitivity as the optimal forward hedge at the expected price (pp. 
1294-1295). Thus, linear hedging instruments play an important part in firms’ hedging 
programs, in theory as well as in practice. However, as shown by Brown and Toft (2002) and 
by Gay, Nam, and Turac (2003), the significance of nonlinear payoffs increases in importance 
when quantity risk increases. We must therefore keep in mind that some information is lost 
for firms exposed to high levels of unhedgeable relative to hedgeable risk when addressing 
linear hedging strategies (first-order effects) only.     
 
3.1 Assumptions 
To study the hedging behavior of a value-maximizing nonfinancial price taker using the 
general model of Section 2, the functions u, v, DWC, and the risk neutral probability measure 
must be specified. Following Brown and Toft (2002) closely, I chose the bivariate normal risk 
neutral probability density f with the parameters P = Q = 1. Thus, expected revenues are 
normalized to approximately one, depending on the assumed price-quantity correlation 
coefficient  and the volatilities P and Q.  The cost structure of the representative firm is 
composed of a variable and a fixed part, both accepted by the corporate tax code, amounting 
to cq and C. Revenue is simply the product of the realized quantity and the realized price, so 
u(p,q) = pq – cq – C. NRI = v(p,q) = pq – cq – CSPT, where CSPT is set equal to C for 
convenience. The statutory special purpose tax rate is assumed to be 30%, while the corporate 
statutory tax rate is set to 28%. Like Brown and Toft, I assume exponentially decreasing 
deadweight costs, 21( )
c NPATDWC NPAT c e  for c1, c2 > 0, where c1  is a scale or location 
parameter controlling the horizontal alignment of DWC, while c2 controls slope and curvature. 
When deadweight costs are not set to zero, the base case assumptions c1 = 0.0075 and c2 = 9 
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are used. c2 is set highBT employed c2 {2,5,8}in order to really test the potential for 
hedge portfolio distortions resulting from tax base asymmetry.  
To account for convex tax functions, marginal tax rates are represented by the following 
functions:5 
  '( ) 0 ,1 1CTCT CTNP
tCT NP
e b
q bq     (13) 
  '( ) 0 ,1 1SPTSPT SPTSPI
tSPT SPI
e b
q bq     (14) 
For sufficiently small , these marginal tax rate functions can approximate statutory tax rates 
applicable to positive tax incomes and allow for non-decreasing marginal tax rates for 
negative tax incomes. This case study sets   to 0.001, in which case the approximation errors 
of the marginal tax rates applicable to positive tax incomes are negligible. The parameters CT 
and SPT govern the rate of decline in marginal tax rates as income becomes increasingly 
negative and the marginal tax rates eventually become zero. Higher s mean higher tax 
function convexity or increased potential hedging gains in the form of lower expected taxes. 
The partial influence of varying   on a firm's tax exposure is illustrated in Figure 1. 
                                                 
5 The marginal tax rate function (13) implies a corporate tax function on the form 
     ln 1 , 0, 1.C NP 1T CT NPCTCT
t ebq q b qb q       . The case of special purpose tax follows analogously. 
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Figure 1. Marginal tax rates for various s representing different degrees of tax function convexity. The limiting 
case   ∞ is the tax function employed in Lien's (2004) analysis of tax base asymmetry. The other extreme ( 
 0) represents the special case of linear tax functions, i.e., when the absolute value of the tax on an arbitrary 
positive profit equals the absolute value of the tax savings arising from a loss of a similar magnitude. 
 
 
3.2 Forward contract demand: the special case of linear tax functions 
The number of contracts, or, equivalently when assuming Q = 1, the hedge ratios of 
value-maximizing firms that account for deadweight costs under conditions with constant 
marginal tax rates, are given as6 
 2min NPAT
CORR
DWCa a as
    (15) 
where 
                                                 
6 Proof is provided in appendices A and B. a* is consistent with the optimal hedge ratio derived by Brown and Toft for the case of linear tax 
functions and no special purpose taxes. This is easily seen by reformulating deadweight costs in terms of net profit before taxes. By replacing 
c2 with c3 = c2 (1-tCT), we find that 
 2 32 1
1 1 1
CTc NP t c NPc NPATc e c e c e     . Nevertheless, the result on the minimum variance 
hedge differs slightly from Brown and Toft's equation (14) in that the contribution margin (P – c) affects the minimum variance hedge ratio. 
Clearly, variance minimization is neither a necessary nor a sufficient strategy for value maximization (a related result is derived by 
Hahnenstein and Röder (2003)). Note that these results hold for arbitrarily small c2 and a positive c1; any hedge ratio is optimal (not only the 
minimum variance solution) for c2 = 0, including the no-hedge solution a* = 0.  Also note that under linear tax exposure, the minimum 
variance solution applies both before and after taxes, that is, 2 2min minNPAT NP
a as s . 
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  2min ) 1 (1NPAT QCT SPT Q PCT P
t ta c
ts
sm m r s
      (16) 
     2 2 22 1 11CT SPTCORRDWC P QCT
t t
a c c
t
m r s     (17) 
In general, value-maximizing firms that face deadweight costs deviate from the minimum 
variance hedge ratio by CORRDWCa . Some interesting implications follow from (15)-(17): 
 
Corollary 1: Consider two otherwise identical value-maximizing firms A and B, differing only 
in that firm A is liable to pay a special purpose tax not faced by firm B. The ratio of firm A’s 
to firm B’s minimum variance forward hedge ratio equals    1 / 1CT SPT CTt t t   , while the 
ratio of the two firms' deadweight cost correction terms equals     21 1/CT SPT CTt t t   . 
Thus, special purpose taxes will always reduce the minimum variance hedge ratio compared 
to otherwise identical firms liable to corporate taxes only. On the other hand, the deadweight 
cost correction term, which is positive for firms expecting positive contribution margins, will 
always be smaller for firms facing special purpose taxes. Consequently, the possibility that 
CT CT SPTa a
 
 cannot be ruled out, but in most economically interesting cases 
CT CT SPTa a
 
 .  
 
Corollary 2: Firms that  face dual taxes generally choose hedge ratios closer to the minimum 
variance forward hedge than firms facing corporate taxes only, provided that P > c. 
 
Corollary 3: Ruling out some rare cases when the minimum hedge ratios are close to zero, 
the smaller the speed with which deadweight costs increase as profits drop (smaller c2), the 
closer is the relative hedge ratio /A Ba a
   to the minimum variance relative hedge ratio 
   1 / 1CT SPT CTt t t    when P > c. The same argument applies to a smaller Qs  and a || 
closer to one. 
 
The main result is illustrated in Figure 2. While it is possible to consider cases where 
,CT CT SPTa a
 
 the vast majority of economically interesting risk exposures entail less 
hedging with special purpose taxes. This finding applies to the Nordic electricity market, 
where Norwegian and Swedish hydroelectricity producers are subject to different tax regimes 
while operating in essentially the same market. Norwegian and Swedish hydroelectricity 
producers 
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Figure 2. The impact of tax income basis asymmetry on forward hedge ratios under conditions of linear tax 
functions across various price-quantity correlation (ρ) and deadweight cost (c2) assumptions for P = 0.2, Q = 
0.15, P = Q = 1, and c = 0.2. The upper surface, which represents the case with tax base asymmetry, generally 
prescribes less hedging relative to the case with corporate taxes only (lower surface), cf. Corollary 1.  
 
 
are subject to similar corporate tax rates (28% in both countries until 2009, 26.3% in Sweden 
beginning in 2009), and Norwegian producers are currently liable to special purpose taxes at a 
rate of 30% in addition to corporate taxes. The analysis predicts that Norwegian 
hydroelectricity producers would generally hedge less than their Swedish counterparts under 
conditions with linear tax exposures, everything else being equal.  
Few firms face linear corporate tax exposure (Eldor & Zilcha, 2002). However, 
because analytical solutions are available for linear taxes only, this special case proves crucial 
for the numerical procedures used to identify how firms facing special purpose taxes generally 
respond to increased corporate tax function convexity. Furthermore, the Norwegian special 
purpose tax regime was changed in 2008 in a way that essentially created linear exposure, at 
least if one considers the Norwegian government as a credible counterpart (no political risk). 
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The new tax provisions promise a tax refund in case of an unused negative accumulated 
special purpose tax income in the event of corporate restructuring events like mergers, 
acquisitions, business foreclosures, etc. Negative tax balances may be carried forward with 
the risk-free rate of interest to reflect the ”sure thing” nature of the negative tax balance 
(Ot.prp. nr. 1, 2007-2008, Norwegian Ministry of Finance). In this case, the special purpose 
tax exposure is linear, or at least very close to linear.  
 
3.3 The influence of corporate tax function convexity on relative forward contract 
demand 
The hedging implications of dual tax exposure under different corporate tax function 
convexity assumptions are now analyzed by solving N first order conditions of value-
maximizing firms’ optimization problem, with and without special purpose taxes. 
Specifically, I first solve N root conditions for N values of iCTb  for ordinary firms and firms  
      
, ,2
, ;
( , ; , , )
1 2
E ( ; )
1
1 1
(1 ) ( , ) 0 i = 1,.., N, j = 1,2 
{ i
CT
i j i j
CT SPT
i CT
P NP p q aP Q
c NPAT p q a
a tp
a e
c c e f p q dqdp
b
b b
b m
q
P


          
 
 
 (18) 
liable to dual taxes when ,1i iCT CT ib b   and ,1 0.00001iSPT ib    (j = 1). In this case, the 
special purpose tax exposure is approximately linear, as in the Norwegian hydropower tax 
regime, and value is the determinant of deadweight costs. Next, I analyze the case when cash 
shortfall or costly external financing is the determinant of deadweight costs (j = 2). In the 
latter case, both betas in the deadweight cost function are set very high to disregard any future 
tax benefits associated with negative profits; ,2 ,2 5000i iCT SPT ib b   . The relative magnitudes 
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of the hedge ratios of firms liable for dual and ordinary tax exposure, respectively, are 
calculated numerically using the following steps (setting CT =  for notational convenience):7 
 
1. Set the value of the corporate tax convexity parameter 1 to 0.00001, i.e., the case 
approximating linear tax functions for which the known hedge ratios (15) apply.  
2. Using the hedge ratio calculated from (15) as the starting value, solve the first order 
condition within given error tolerances to arrive at  1 .CTa b  
3. Reset the tax convexity parameter to 2 and solve for  2CTa b  using  1CTa b  as the 
starting value. 
4. Repeat the procedure until  CT Na b has been calculated using  1CT Na b   as the 
starting value. At this point, the set         1 2, , ,CT CT CT CT Na a ab b b b   a  has been 
backed out from the N first order conditions associated with the N values for . 
5. Repeat steps 1-4 with dual taxes to arrive at the set  CT SPT b a . Calculate the set of 
relative hedge ratios   
 
 
 
 1 21 2, ,..,
CT SPT CT SPT CT SPT N
RELATIVE
CT CT CT N
a a a
a a a
b b b
b b b
  
  
  
      
a . 
Deviations from one represent distortions imposed on firms’ hedge ratios by special 
purpose taxes, everything else equal. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates relative forward hedge ratios for cases 1-4 under conditions with very 
high deadweight costs, while Figure 4 shows these values when cash shortfall is the key 
determinant of deadweight cost in the spirit of Froot and Stein (1993). Both figures show that 
special purpose taxes can distort the hedging strategies of nonfinancial firms. Defining any 
                                                 
7 Optimal hedge ratios were calculated for  up to 5000. However, since the values leveled out, only results for   1500 are presented. All 
calculations were performed using global adaptive integration methods in Mathematica 6.0.0 with PrecionGoal = 7, AccuracyGoal = 12, 
MinRecursion = 5, MaxRecursion = 50, and WorkingPrecision = 40 at maximum, integrating over zP  zQ ={(zPzQ): zP  (-10,10), zQ  (-
10,10)}. Several robustness checks were performed to validate the results, including reducing the integration region to include fewer standard 
deviations. 
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deviation of a relative hedge ratio from one as a distortion imposed by special purpose taxes 
on firm hedging, the significance of the distortions seems to depend on the underlying 
exposure as well on whether value or cash shortfall is the key determinant of deadweight 
costs. Experiments with c2 = 2 and c2 = 5 confirmed the a priori expectation that the 
distortions become less significant as the curvature parameter c2 approaches zero. Note that  
Figures 3 and 4 can represent the case of Norwegian hydroelectricity producers; the 
distortions will be larger with the special purpose petroleum tax rate of 50% applicable to 
companies operating on the Norwegian continental shelf.  
Overall, the distortions imposed by special purpose taxes seem moderate, even under 
conditions with very high deadweight costs. Remember that Brown and Toft (2002) assumed 
c2{2,5,8}, the equivalent of c2 {2(1-tCT),5(1-tCT),8(1-tCT)} under conditions with linear tax 
exposure when deadweight costs are specified in terms of after-tax profits, which are more 
moderate assumptions about the speed with which deadweight costs increase as profits drop. 
As corporate tax exposure become more convex, value-maximizing firms tend to increase the 
relative amount of hedging, eventually leveling out at some relative hedge ratio 
1 1
1
CT SPT CT SPT
CT CT
t t a
t a



     for economically interesting parameters. This pattern parallels the 
influence of an increasing deadweight cost parameter c2 under conditions with linear tax 
exposure, in which case the relative hedging demand increases to reduce the value of 
deadweight  costs (Corollary 1). In that case, the distortions become larger as deadweight 
costs turn less extreme, approaching the case of the relative minimum variance forward 
hedging demand    1 / 1CT SPT CTt t t    (Corollary 3). Note that the special purpose tax does 
not distort the hedging demand of a value-maximizing dual tax firm when c2 equals zero 
(Proposition 1), while a similar firm minimizing the profit variance would chose the relative 
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hedging demand    1 / 1CT SPT CTt t t   in the case of linear tax exposure because the special 
purpose tax serves as a partial hedge.  
All things considered, the argument put forward by the Norwegian tax authorities that 
special purpose taxes are essentially neutral is not entirely correct for firms operating in the 
Brown and Toft setting. This is particularly the case for value-maximizing firms facing 
potentially low or moderate deadweight costs and linear corporate tax exposure. The 
distortions imposed on firms facing convex corporate tax exposure as well as deadweight 
costs seem to be smaller the higher the degree of corporate tax function convexity. With less 
hedging initially, the downward adjustment necessary to restore optimality in response to 
higher tax function convexity is generally smaller in magnitude for dual tax firms than for 
ordinary firms. This result parallels the influence of the parameter c2 on the extent of hedging 
described in Corollary 1. 
 
Figure 3. Relative hedge ratios    , / ,CT SPCT SPT CT CT SPTTa ab b b b   for  CT =  and SPT = 0.0001 when 
value is the key determinant of deadweight costs, that is, numerical solutions of equation (18) given linear 
special purpose tax exposure. The leftmost markers correspond to the relative hedge ratios given by (16). The 
relative hedge ratios corresponding to the beta values {0.00001,1,5,10,25} left out from the plot for case 2,  = -
0.9, are {16.5, 15.8, 16.8, 321.5, -.21}. Such results may arise when the hedge ratios are close to zero, cf. 
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Corollary 1. Any deviation from one is interpreted as a distortion imposed by special purpose taxes on firm 
hedging.   = 0.001, c1 = 0.0075, c2 = 9 , tCT = 0.28, and tSPT = 0.3. 
 
   
  
 
Figure 4. Relative hedge ratios    , / ,CT SPCT SPT CT CT SPTTa ab b b b   when cash shortfall is the key 
determinant of deadweight costs in the spirit of Froot & Stein (1993). Approximated by setting SPT and SPT  
equal to 5000 in the exponential deadweight cost function (approximates ∞) while letting CT =   in the 
second product term of the first order condition (18) vary. The leftmost markers correspond to the relative hedge 
ratios given by (16). Any deviation from one is interpreted as a distortion imposed by special purpose taxes on 
firm hedging.   = 0.001, c1 = 0.0075, c2 = 9, tCT = 0.28, and tSPT = 0.3. 
 
 
4.  Concluding remarks  
While a large strand of literature studies how rent taxes may distort firms’ operating 
and investment decisions (Baunsgaard, 2001; Lund, 2009; McPhail, Daniel, King, Moran, & 
Otto, 2009; Otto et al., 2006), to the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to analyze 
how firms’ financial strategies may be influenced by rent taxation. I analyze the influence of 
dual tax exposure in the form of a special purpose tax on top of corporate income tax on the 
hedging demand of value-maximizing nonfinancial firms. Using an extended version of the 
model of Brown and Toft (2002), I demonstrate that special purpose taxes do not influence 
 20
the extent of firm hedging when corporate tax function convexity is the only theoretical 
motivation for hedging. This holds under general conditions about production technology, tax 
provisions, and tax function convexity. With the possibility of deadweight costs that are high 
when profits are low and low when profits are high, such as direct and indirect costs of 
financial distress and costly external financing, moderate distortions are introduced for 
constant-returns-to-scale firms committed to hedging with forward contracts. The relative 
hedging demand of firms liable to dual taxes lies between the ratio    1 / 1CT SPT CTt t t    
and one in the vast majority of cases. This suggests that the type of special purpose taxes 
analyzed in this paper will not critically impede the development of a market for the transfer 
of price risk, like in the case of  tax-disadvantaged corn yield futures on Chicago Board of 
Trade reported by Lien (2004). The success of Nord Pool ASA, the Nordic electricity 
exchange, in establishing and sustaining a market for the transferral of price risk even with 
special purpose taxation imposed on Norwegian hydroelectricity producers bears some 
evidence in support of this claim. However, because my analysis is predicated on a single-
period incomplete market model, these results do not necessarily apply beyond the case when 
producers face identically and independently distributed random variables representing 
hedgeable and unhedgeable risk. In order to analyze multiperiod hedging with statistically 
dependent realizations of the hedgeable and unhedgeable random variables, a dynamic model 
is called for. This is left for future research. 
Although this study has been motivated by the Norwegian hydropower and petroleum 
tax regimes, its implications are probably not confined to Norway. Various oil, gas and 
mineral tax regimes designed to extract rent are applied all over the world; see Table 3 in 
Baunsgaard (2001) for an overview. Despite considerable variations in the setup for rent 
taxation across countries, the global trend is to move away from production-based taxes to 
profit-based taxes for rent extraction, that is, to design rent tax regimes more like the 
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Norwegian model (McPhail et al., 2009, p. 37). The predictions of this paper are therefore 
expected to be relevant for most governments seeking to extract economic rent on behalf of 
their constituents, i.e., for understanding how dual taxes may influence firms’ financial 
strategies. Because it is a possible that financial and real decisions sometimes interact, this 
paper could also prove important for the ongoing research into the optimal design of rent 
taxes on firms’ investment and operating decisions reviewed by Lund (2009).  
   
 
Appendix A. The optimal number of forward contracts for constant marginal tax rates 
 
The optimal choice of forward sales is found by solving the problem 
 
 
   max E ( ) max ( , ; ) 1 ( , )
( ( , ; )) ( , )}
a a CT SPTP Q
a NP p q a t t SPI p q
DWC NPAT p q a f p q dqdp
P   

    (A.1) 
 
given  ( ) Ph p p m  . Because the derivative of the deadweight cost function is given by  
  2 ( , ; )2 1' ( , ; ) c NPAT p q aDWC NPAT p q a c c e  and the analytical expression for the bivariate  
normal distribution is 
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the first order condition defined in equation (12) now becomes 
 
    
      22
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0
Q P QP
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where  1 2 22
1and ( 1)
2 12 1P Q
c cA B rrps s r
   . Expanding and collecting terms in  
the exponent with similar powers of p, q, and pq reduces the expression above to 
 
 
         22 4 3 56 1 2E ( ) 0d q d p q d qd a d p d a pPP Qa Ae p e e dqdpa m
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where 
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Note that the appearance of the first order condition (A.3) is identical to Brown’s and Toft's 
(2002) equation (A.3), except for the definitions of the "d-constants". Given that p is a 
constant when integrating over the space of the RV Q, we may define 7 3 5( )d p d p d  and 
reformulate the innermost integral into the form  
2
4 7 .d q d p q
Q
e dq   This definite integral has 
the solution 
2
7
44
4
d
de
d
p . Substituting for 7d and rearranging yields the first order condition 
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The constant in front of the integral will never be zero, so the problem reduces to finding the a  
satisfying 
 
      212E ( ) 0C p D pPPa p e dpa m
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where
2
3
1
4
2
2
dC d
d
   and  3 5 2
4
2d dD d a
d
  . The finite solution of the lhs of (A.5) is 
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3
2
2 ( )E ( ) 2
D a P
C
C D aa
e
a C
p mP    (A.6) 
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for C > 0 (sufficient condition for keeping the integrand from exploding). This condition will  
always be satisfied for 1r  . 
 
Proof.  
   
 
222
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1 2 2
4
1 1 1
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2 1
CT SPT P Q
P
c t tdC d
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r s
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Because the denominator is positive,  
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The fact that the lhs (rhs) is always positive (negative) proves the claim C > 0. ■ 
 
 
Thus, the first order condition (A.5) reduces to 2 ( ) 0PC D am   . Inserting for C and D(a) 
yields 
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Solving for a, we get 
 
 
 
     2 22
1
1
1 1
QCT SPT
Tax Q P
CT P
P CT SPT Q
t ta c
t
c c t t
sm m r s
m r s
      
    
 (A.8) 
The expected economic profit is indeed a strictly concave function of a, so this is a unique  
solution provided c2 > 0 (any hedge ratio will be optimal if c2 = 0). This follows  
directly from the second derivative of equation (A.2): 
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Appendix B.  The after-tax minimum variance forward contract demand for constant          
marginal tax rates  
 
The variance of the net profit after taxes is defined as  2 2( )E NPAT E NPAT     or 
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The first order condition for the after-tax variance minimizing forward hedge ratio is 
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Inserting for the bivariate normal density, the first order condition may be reformulated as 
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The solutions of the five integrals corresponding to the terms involving 
   1 2 3 4 5, , , andd d a d d d a are     2 2 2 21 22 , ,Q P P P P Q P Pd dm m s m rs s m s    
   3 4 5, an, dP Q P Q Q Pd d d am m rs s m m , respectively. Thus, the first order condition is  
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Inserting for the constants, expanding and collecting terms yields the first order condition 
        2 1 1 0NPAT P Q P CT P Q CT SPT SPT Q Pa t c t t tas s m s m rs m s              (B.4) 
 
Solving for a yields the after-linear-tax minimum variance forward contract demand because 
2
NPATs  is strictly convex in a.  
 
  2 2 22 1 0NPAT P CTta
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Thus, the unique after-linear-tax minimum variance contract demand is  
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Given constant marginal tax rates, this is also the number of forward contracts that minimizes  
the variance of before-tax profits. 
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Appendix C. The marginal density and distribution function of the absolutely 
continuous RV NPAT for the class of price derivatives 
 
To see why NPAT is an absolutely continuous RV, observe in Figure 5 that 
 1 ; ,NPAT p npat a defines an infinitely large set of curves in 2 .8 There are two curves for 
every value of npat, one on each side of the vertical asymptote at p = c, covering mutually 
exclusive parts of the realization range of the RV Q. A small change in the ordered pair (p,q) 
will always cause a small change in npat; for no such change will a discontinuous change in 
npat be observed.  1 ; ,NPAT p npat a is discontinuous in an immediate region around the 
vertical asymptote, but NPAT is still an absolutely continuous RV. Thus, a marginal density 
of the RV NPAT exists and may be found using a well-known theorem from the theory of 
functions of RVs. Having found the marginal density, the distribution function of NPAT is 
easily found. However, an alternative, more intuitive derivation of the distribution function is 
provided by integrating over the space of P and Q using p-dependent integration limits. 
 
 
Figure 5. The inverse function 1( ; , )q NPAT p npat a  for some arbitrarily chosen values of 
npat, under the assumption of no derivatives contracts, linear tax functions, P = Q, tSPT = 0.3, 
tCT = 0.28, C = 0.45, CSPT = 0.55, and c = 0.2. For p > c, increasing q implies higher npat for 
any given p. For p = c, 1and ( ; , )p c p cnpat npat NPAT c npat a

  a a  is arbitrary. For p < c, 
increasing q implies lower npat for any given p. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The parameters  and  are now incorporated into the general expressions for corporate taxes, purely for notational ease. 
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For the studied model,  
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It follows from the model assumptions that 
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which proves the existence of the inverse functions  1 ; ,p cNPAT npat p a ,  
 1 ; ,p cNPAT npat p a and the non-existence of  1 ; ,p c p cNPAT npat c a a . 9 Given that the  
choice of q is arbitrary for p = c and  , 0c
c Q
f p q dqdp   , we may define the inverse  
function 
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 (C.2) 
Thus,  1 ; ,NPAT npat p a  yields the unique value q that corresponds to any npat within the 
range of  , ;NPAT p q a , possibly excluding p cnpat a  when p and the number of contracts are 
fixed.  1 ; ,NPAT npat p a is generally implicitly defined by the equation 
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a h a  (C.3) 
but for the special case of linear tax functions, the inverse function is explicitly defined as 
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a  (C.4) 
Following Dudewicz’s and Mishra’s (1988) Theorem 4.6.4/4.6.18, the joint density of  
the RVs P and NPAT, ( , ; )p npaty a , may be derived as 
 
                                                 
9 For a given hedge ratio vector a and payoff vector h(p), there is one unique after-tax profit, p cnpat 
a
, for p = c, irrespective of q. 
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 (C.5) 
where ( , ; ) 0p npaty a and ( , ; ) 1p npat dp dnpaty     a . Inserting for  
 1( , ; , )f p NPAT npat p a and setting PP
P
pz ms
 , [ , ; ]Q Pz z npat a  
 1 ; ,P Q
Q
NPAT npat z m
s
 a
,  2
1
2 1
B r  , the bivariate density of the RVs P and NPAT  may  
be compactly reformulated as a function of the RVs andPZ NPAT . 
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Thus, the marginal density of the RV NPAT  is 
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 (C.7) 
where  
 
2
1 , ' '( ( , [ , ; ], )), ' '( ( , [ , ; ]))
2 1
P Q P P Q P
Q
K CT CT NP z z z npat SPT SPT SPI z z z npat
ps r
   a a a
. 
  
There is no analytical solution of this integral, but the marginal distribution may be obtained  
using numerical methods because the integrand is well behaved. It is easy to see that  
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     so the critical question is what happens to the  
integrand as PP
P
cz ms
  from either side. This is a "0/0"-type limit, but the integrand is well  
behaved as the rate of convergence to zero is faster in the numerator than in the denominator. 
 
The distribution function may be numerically obtained from ( ; )npatF a , of course. However,  
it may also be derived by integrating over the space of the RVs P and Q using  
 1 ; ,NPAT npat p a as p-dependent integration limits of Q for any given npat within the  
range of NPAT.  Inserting for f(p,q), defining  2
1
2 1
B r   and rewriting the integrals in  
terms of the standardized RVs andQ Pz z , the distribution function becomes 
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 (C.8) 
This distribution function may be more compactly formulated as 
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where  
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It is easily shown that '[ ; ] ( ; )F npat npatFa a , as required. 
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Appendix D.  Proof of concavity for zero deadweight costs and h(p) = p - P 
 
The maximand (10) is a concave function of the hedge ratio a for the case of nondecreasing  
marginal tax rates, zero deadweight costs, and h(p) = (p - P).  
 
Proof.  
 
The first order condition (11) may be rewritten as follows:10 
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Thus, 
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Equation (13) implies that  
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Inserting for CT’’ yields 
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 (D.1) 
                                                 
10 f* is the bivariate density of the standardized price and quantity variables P and Q; f* = P f. 
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Let's rewrite the first line of (D.1) as follows, denoting the marginal density of the  
standardized price variable as g*: 
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A similar result is achieved for the second line of (D.1). Adding together, we find that  
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The first line above is zero because 0
Pz
m  . The second and third lines are both  
negative.  Thus,  2 2E ( )aa
P
  has been shown to be negative, i.e., the expected economic profit  
is a concave function of a for the special case with no deadweight costs. ■ 
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